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We find that social capital, as captured by secular norms and social networks surrounding 
corporate headquarters, is negatively associated with levels of CEO compensation. This 
relation holds in a range of robustness tests including those that address omitted variable 
bias and reverse causality. Additionally, social capital reduces the likelihood that firms 
make opportunistic option grant awards that unduly favor CEOs, including lucky awards, 
backdated awards, and unscheduled awards. Social capital also lessens the accretive effect 
of CEO power on CEO compensation. These findings indicate that social capital mitigates 
agency problems by restraining managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation. 
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1.  Introduction 
Individuals, and even organizations, are susceptible to social influences in the geographical 
areas in which they reside.1 In particular, research across various disciplines in social science, 
including Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), and Buonanno, Montolio, and 
Vanin (2009), has provided consistent evidence that social capital, as captured by strength of 
secular norms and density of social networks in geographical areas, discourages opportunistic 
behaviors, encourages cooperation, facilitates economic transactions, and produces positive 
economic outcomes. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) provide a review of this literature and 
conclude that economic research in social capital would benefit by emphasizing norms that 
prescribe “the set of values and beliefs that help cooperation” (i.e., cooperative norms). Following 
this practice, recent research finds that social capital matters in the corporate setting (e.g., Jha and 
Chen, 2015). More specifically, managers of corporations with headquarters located in areas with 
higher levels of social capital tend to constrain self-serving corporate practices that could benefit 
shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders (e.g., Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang, 2017a).  
Building on these studies, we explore whether social capital in local geographical areas 
surrounding corporate headquarters mitigates agency problems in resident corporations.  
Agency problems can result in managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation, leading 
to opportunistic pay practices that unduly favor the CEO and higher pay levels (e.g., Yermack, 
1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 
                                                        
1 For instance, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004, 2005) find that social interactions in local geographical areas 
promote stock market participation and affect trades of money managers residing in the areas. Pirinsky and Wang 
(2006) find that social interactions in local geographical areas surrounding corporate headquarters contribute to 
comovement in the stock returns among resident corporations. Hilary and Hui (2009) and McGuire, Omer, and Sharp 
(2012) find that religious adherence surrounding corporate headquarters promotes conservative corporate investment 
and reduces the incidences of financial reporting irregularities. 
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2003). Rent extraction behaviors are contradictory to the prescribed values of cooperative norms. 
Moreover, dense social networks help to communicate and enforce the attendant code of conduct 
associated with cooperative norms (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Uzzi, 1996; Woolcock, 
1998). Therefore, managers of firms with headquarters located in areas with higher levels of 
social capital should anticipate greater marginal costs for exploiting rent extraction opportunities 
(e.g., Elster, 1989; Posner, 2000) when compared to their counterparts with headquarters located 
in areas with lower levels of social capital. Accordingly, we conjecture that social capital 
surrounding corporate headquarters mitigates managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation, 
leading to negative associations between social capital and opportunistic pay practices that unduly 
favor CEOs and resulting in lower levels of CEO pay.  
We focus the main analysis on CEO total compensation and equity-based pay (i.e., stock 
and option awards) because these measures reflect broad consequences of managerial rent 
extraction in CEO compensation (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Morse, Nanda, and Seru, 
2011). Additionally, following Narayanan and Seyhun (2008), Lie (2005), and Bebchuk, Grinstein, 
and Peyer (2010), we use incidences of unscheduled awards, backdated awards, and lucky awards 
to capture specific consequences of opportunistic timing in CEO option grant awards that unduly 
favor CEOs. 
Our empirical analyses explore the effects of social capital in US counties on both CEO 
pay levels and opportunistic timing in CEO option awards of local corporations headquartered in 
the county. The social capital measure is based on data that reflect county-level secular influences 
arising from social networks and cooperative norms (e.g., Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater, 
2006), where cooperative norms are non-religious social norms that emphasize cooperative 
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behaviors (e.g., Knack, 1992). The social capital construct could reflect influences arising from 
county-level factors such as economic development, infrastructure quality, labor market quality, 
diversity, political preferences, and religious adherence (e.g., Putnam, 1995; Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater, 2006). Accordingly, we include a range 
of county-level measures to isolate the effects of income level, population growth, population 
density, latitude, longitude, distance to river, age, educational level, nonwhite population 
percentage, relative strength of Democratic/Republican party as captured by electoral outcomes, 
and religious adherence as captured by the fraction of a county’s population that claims affiliation 
with an organized religion. We also include a range of firm-level variables to control for 
differences in firm attributes, CEO attributes, and corporate governance that can potentially affect 
CEO compensation; and, we include year and industry fixed effects in the empirical models. 
Using a comprehensive sample of annual compensation data drawn from the Compustat 
ExecuComp database in the two decades of 1993–2014, we find negative and statistically 
significant relations between social capital and the levels of CEO total compensation and CEO 
equity-based pay, holding all the aforementioned factors constant. When the level of the county’s 
social capital increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in our data, our coefficient 
estimates translate into a reduction of 17.31% (0.1731=$0.452 million÷$2.612 million) in CEO 
equity-based compensation and a reduction of 7.97% (0.0797=$0.367 million÷$4.606 million) in 
CEO total compensation, on average, respectively. 
We perform a range of tests to allay concerns of omitted variable bias. First, we identify 
preferences for redistribution, income inequality, and metropolitan setting as omitted variables that 
could cause a negative association between social capital and CEO pay and create spurious 
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associations in our regression models (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Yamamura, 2012; Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2002; Glaeser, 2010; Rupasingha,  Goetz, and Freshwater, 2006). Our results are 
robust and the estimated coefficients on social capital do not attenuate significantly when we 
control for differences in these factors in the regressions. Additionally, our results are robust in a 
range of sensitivity analyses that isolate the effects of other unknown (and therefore omitted) 
factors affecting CEO pay. In particular, our results are robust when we use region fixed-effect 
regressions and state fixed-effect regressions, indicating that unknown time-invariant region-level 
or state-level factors do not explain our findings. Our results also hold when we use the average 
of CEO pay in other firms headquartered in the same county to isolate the influences of unknown 
county-level factors affecting local pay practices. Lastly, our results hold when we include 
additional controls to isolate the influences of anti-takeover protection and general managerial 
skills.  
Even so, reverse causality could make it challenging to infer a causal relation between CEO 
pay and social capital. To mitigate this concern, we use an epidemiological approach (e.g., Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006; Algan and Cahuc, 2010) to construct instruments for social capital 
based on inherited cultural preferences, namely, cultural preferences that people in a given US 
county inherited from their ancestral origins. These instruments are based on Hofstede’s scores of 
national culture, namely, masculinity-femininity and power distance. Our results are unchanged in 
instrumental-variable two-stage regressions where we use these inherited cultural preferences as 
instruments for social capital. 
Further, our results are also unchanged when we use an alternate social capital measure 
and alternate samples including using a propensity score matched sample to estimate the model. 
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We also find similar results using an alternate empirical design that isolates the effects of over-time 
changes in social capital on over-time changes in CEO compensation. In this analysis, we use a 
difference-in-differences method to compare changes in CEO compensation surrounding 
corporate headquarter relocation events that change the level of social capital that firms face.   
Consistent with Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005), we find that, on average, powerful 
CEOs—those CEOs who simultaneously hold the titles of chairperson of the board of directors 
and president of the company—extract higher compensation in both total pay and equity-based 
pay holding other factors constant. Given our conjecture, one would expect that social capital 
moderates the positive power-pay relation. Indeed, we find that social capital significantly reduces 
the positive power-pay relation, suggesting that social capital moderates the accretive effect of 
CEO power on CEO compensation.  
The aforementioned results provide tentative evidence that social capital restrains 
managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation setting. To pin down this inference, we follow 
Lie (2005), Narayanan and Seyhun (2008), and Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) to examine 
the effects of social capital on incidences of CEO option grant awards that likely embody 
consequences of managerial rent extraction, including unscheduled awards, lucky awards, and 
backdated awards. An unscheduled award is an award that follows no particular timing pattern. A 
lucky award is an award with a grant date that has the lowest price in the grant month. A backdated 
award is an award that is associated with abnormally higher stock price returns surrounding the 
award date. (We provide detailed definitions of each of these awards in Section 6.)  
We employ two alternate samples for these additional analyses. The first sample is drawn 
from the Thomson Financial Insider Trading database and covers the time period of 1993–2006 in 
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the main analysis. It contains 12,812 firm-years with at least one unscheduled option grant award 
to the CEO in the year. We use this sample to explore the effects of social capital on incidences of 
unscheduled awards and backdated awards, respectively. The second sample contains 9,872 
firm-years between 1996 and 2005 for which around 14% of the observations include at least one 
lucky award in the year. This sample is derived from the sample analyzed by Bebchuk, Grinstein, 
and Peyer (2010). We find that social capital reduces the likelihood that a firm makes at least one 
lucky award to its CEO in a given year; social capital also reduces the likelihood that a firm makes 
at least one backdated award (or at least one unscheduled award) to its CEO in a given year. These 
additional findings provide direct evidence that social capital limits opportunistic timing in CEO 
option grant awards.  
Taken together, our results indicate that social capital surrounding corporate headquarters 
limits opportunistic timing in CEO option grant awards that unduly favor CEOs, reduces the 
influences of CEO power in setting CEO pay, and reduces the levels of equity-based pay and 
overall compensation for CEOs. These findings provide novel evidence that social capital 
mitigates agency problems in corporations by limiting the consequences of managerial rent 
extraction in CEO compensation setting.  
To date, researchers have treated CEO compensation and social capital as disparate 
constructs; and, there is little effort to explore the systematic linkage between them. Building on 
the insight that cooperative norms and social networks in geographical areas affect individual 
behaviors and corporate decisions (refer to Footnote 1 and Section 2 for more in-depth discussion), 
we provide evidence that such secular, social influences also mitigate agency problems in CEO 
compensation setting. This particular insight bridges the research in social capital and CEO 
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compensation. Specifically, it shows an unexplored economic benefit of social capital for 
shareholders of publicly listed corporations through the mitigation of agency conflicts in CEO 
compensation, extending the results of Knack and Keefer (1997) and Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2004, 2008) on social capital and the results of Yermack (1997), Bebchuk, Fried, and 
Walker (2002), Bebchuk and Fried (2003), Lie (2005), and Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) 
on managerial rent extraction in CEO pay. 
More broadly, our findings add to a better understanding of how secular norms and 
networks surrounding corporate headquarters affect publicly listed corporations. Hasan, Hoi, Wu, 
and Zhang (2017a, b) find that such secular influences constrain corporate tax avoidance and 
facilitate debt contracting. Jha and Chen (2015) find that such secular influences engender trust 
between the firm and external auditors, resulting in lower audit fees. We find that, holding other 
factors constant, such secular influences mitigate agency problems in CEO compensation. We 
view all of these findings as complementary: they indicate that secular norms and networks in 
geographical areas could constrain corporate practices that are incongruent with the prescribed 
values and standards associated with the prevailing, attendant norms in the areas.   
Prior research on executive compensation, including Hartzell and Starks (2003), Morse, 
Nanda, and Seru (2011), Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013), has focused on the influences of 
firm-level and executive-level factors. Despite voluminous research, we still know little about 
whether and how influences arising from social institutions, particularly social influences arising 
from institutions in local geographical areas, affect executive compensation. As such, our findings 
are informative in that they provide fresh evidence to fill this particular gap in the executive 
compensation literature.  
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2.  Prior literature and hypothesis development 
Agency problems can result in significant managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation, 
leading to opportunistic pay practices that unduly favor the CEO and higher pay levels (Yermack, 
1997; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Lie, 2005; Bebchuk, Grinstein, 
and Peyer, 2010). This section provides a review of the social capital literature and develops the 
hypothesis that expounds the deterrent effect of social capital on opportunistic behaviors, including 
managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation.   
2.1. Social capital and opportunistic behaviors  
Prior studies have deployed various operating definitions of social capital (Rupasingha, 
Goetz, and Freshwater, 2006). Despite that, a common approach advocated by Coleman (1988), 
Putnam (1993), Knack and Keefer (1997), Woolcock (1998), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2004) is to define social capital as an environmental factor that captures the confluence of effects 
arising from the strength of social norms and the density of associational networks in a 
geographical community. Taking this logic one step further, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) 
argue that economic research on social capital should focus on norms that prescribe “the set of 
values and beliefs that help cooperation” (i.e., cooperative norms). This is reasonable since 
cooperative norms tend to constrain narrow self-interest (Knack and Keefer, 1997), limit 
opportunistic behaviors in transactions (Coleman, 1988), and help to overcome the free rider 
problem by increasing trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008, 2011). Heeding this advice, we 
adopt the approach that identifies cooperative norms and social networks as key constituents of 
social capital (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Woolcock, 1998). 
  9 
There is evidence that individuals residing in communities with higher levels of social 
capital—namely, people residing in communities with strong cooperative norms and dense social 
networks—are less likely to engage in opportunistic, self-serving behaviors. For instance, 
Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez (2002) and Buonanno, Montolio, and Vanin (2009) find that 
social capital deters individuals from engaging in criminal behaviors. Bjornskov (2003) finds that 
individuals in higher-social-capital countries are less likely to accept bribes or bribe others. Posner 
(1980) finds that dense social networks in African villages reduce the opportunistic behaviors of 
villagers. Across these studies, the intuition is that individuals perceive opportunistic behaviors as 
contradictory to the prescribed values associated with cooperative norms while dense social 
networks help to communicate and enforce the attendant code of conduct through more frequent, 
repeated social interactions. Uzzi (1996), Fukuyama (1995), and Fischer and Pollock (2004) argue 
that frequent, repeated social interactions amount to repeated games over time that cultivate a code 
of conduct that deters opportunistic behaviors. Coleman (1988, p. S100) argues that “social capital 
exists in the relation among persons” because social networks provide efficient information 
sharing and better communication and enforcement of the prescribed norms. Accordingly, one 
would expect that dense social networks intensify the costs that individuals anticipate for 
perpetrating opportunistic behaviors. On one hand, these costs include external social sanctions 
(Coleman, 1988) such as social ostracism (Uhlaner, 1989) and stigmatization (Posner, 2000). On 
the other hand, since individuals have a great need to maintain a moral self-concept (Mazar, Amir, 
and Ariely, 2008),  these costs also include psychic costs produced by heightened negative moral 
sentiments such as guilt and shame, which could arise even if the actual behaviors are unobserved 
(Higgins, 1987; Elster, 1989). Consequently, individuals in communities with higher levels of 
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social capital, as captured by strong cooperative norms and dense social networks, should 
anticipate higher marginal cost for perpetrating opportunistic, self-serving behaviors. Therefore, 
one would expect that social capital deters individuals from engaging in opportunistic behaviors.  
2.2. The effect of social capital on managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation   
If social capital deters individual opportunistic behaviors, social capital should also limit 
opportunistic corporate practices because corporate decisions are made by managers (e.g., 
Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) and corporate managers are susceptible to social influences 
surrounding corporate headquarters (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009). Evidence is consistent with this 
conjecture. For instance, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2018) and Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2017b) find 
that firms headquartered in US counties with higher levels of social capital—hereafter, 
high-social-capital firms—undertake fewer corporate activities that could benefit shareholders at 
the expense of other stakeholders. Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2017a) find that high-social-capital 
firms pay more corporate taxes, indicating that social capital in US counties helps to cultivate a 
local environment that deters corporate tax avoidance practices, which are widely perceived by 
people in the society outside of the corporate sector as contradictory to the prescribed values and 
standards of cooperative norms. Collectively, these findings imply that managers anticipate higher 
costs for undertaking opportunistic corporate dealings when their firms are headquartered in areas 
with higher levels of social capital. However, we still know little about whether social capital 
mitigates agency conflicts between shareholders and managers; and, more specifically, we still 
know little about whether social capital constrains managerial rent extraction in CEO 
compensation.  
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CEOs have significant influences in setting their own pay and they tend to use their 
influences to exploit more opportunistic pay practices that unduly favor themselves and extract 
higher levels of compensation.2 Accordingly, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) argue that many 
equity-based compensation practices can be construed as outcomes of managerial rent extraction. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) advocate the argument that views executive compensation as an agency 
problem.  
Nevertheless, based on the insights from the aforementioned social capital literature, one 
would expect that managers anticipate higher marginal costs for perpetrating opportunistic 
behaviors, including those that pertain to their own compensation, particularly when their firms 
are headquartered in high-social-capital areas. Consequently, just as social capital deters 
opportunistic individual behaviors and corporate practices, social capital should also deter 
managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation. Moreover, since outcomes of CEO 
compensation practices are observable and, in fact, they are under heavy public scrutiny and 
regulatory oversight, it is likely that the purported disciplinary effects of social capital could be 
significant. We formulate the prediction from this perspective as a testable hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 1. Managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation is negatively associated 
with social capital surrounding corporate headquarters. 
                                                        
2 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that CEO total compensation responds to random firm performance 
shocks beyond the CEO’s control, implying that CEOs are rewarded for luck. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) find that 
CEO pay is more sensitive to good luck (i.e., more sensitive to industry or market benchmarks when such benchmarks 
are up) than to bad luck. Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) find that CEOs use their influence to rig compensation 
contracts by shifting weights toward performance measures that are doing better. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that 
managerial influences drive the cash bonus payments that CEOs receive for completing mergers and acquisitions. On 
the other hand, Yermack (1997) provides evidence that CEOs use their influence over timing of stock option awards 
to capitalize on impending improvements in corporate performance. Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2009) find that 
stock returns are generally negative before option grants but they are generally positive after option grants, suggesting 
that option awards could be backdated. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) find that CEOs receiving option grants 
at the lowest price of the grant month also have higher total pay, even after controlling for other factors that explain 
CEO compensation. 
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3.  Research design and summary statistics 
This section introduces the empirical measures that we use to capture broad consequences 
of managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation and social capital, describes the baseline 
regression model, explains the sampling procedure, and presents the summary statistics.  
3.1.  Measures of CEO pay 
CEO total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, equity-based compensation, and 
various other forms of compensation including deferred compensation, contribution to retirement 
plan, change-in-control payments, perquisites, and other personal benefits. Equity-based 
compensation, which comprises a large portion of a CEO’s total pay, includes values of option 
grant awards and values of restricted stock awards. Prior research suggests that CEOs wield 
significant influences in setting their own pay and these influences could exemplify in more 
opportunistic pay practices that unduly favor the CEOs and higher levels of CEO compensation 
(Yermack, 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003; Lie, 2005; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010; 
Morse, Nanda, and Seru, 2011). Accordingly, we focus our analysis on the levels of CEO total 
compensation and CEO equity-based pay because these measures reflect broad consequences of 
managerial rent extraction. The variable, Total pay (Equity pay), is the natural logarithm of one 
plus CEO total compensation (CEO equity-based compensation) as reported in the Compustat 
ExecuComp database for a firm in a given year. Although not our focus, we also provide evidence 
based on cash and other compensation for the CEO. Bonus (Salary) is the natural logarithm of one 
plus CEO cash bonus payment (CEO cash salary) as reported in the Compustat ExecuComp 
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database for a firm in a given year. Other pay is the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of 
long-term performance payout in incentive plans (before 2006), deferred compensation (after 
2006), contribution to retirement plan, perquisites, change-in-control payments, other personal 
benefits, etc. To mitigate the influence of extreme observations, we winsorize these CEO 
compensation variables and all other continuous variables in the study at the 0.5% and the 99.5% 
levels. 
3.2.  Social capital measure 
We define social capital as joint influences arising from social networks and cooperative 
norms in US counties. The Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NRCRD) at the 
Pennsylvania State University provides data that capture cooperative norms and social networks 
in all US counties in the years of 1990, 1997, 2005, and 2009, respectively. Rupasingha, Goetz, 
and Freshwater (2006) describe these data in detail. The data contain information on voter turnouts 
in presidential elections (Pvote), response rates in US census surveys (Respn), total numbers of ten 
types of social organizations (Assn), and total numbers of nonprofit organizations (Nccs). 
The Nccs measure reflects individual participation in tax-exempt nonprofit organizations 
with a domestic focus. The Assn captures individual participation in a range of social organizations 
including bowling centers, physical fitness facilities, public golf courses, sports clubs, civic 
associations, business associations, political organizations, religious organizations, and labor 
organizations. These measures are particularly relevant for our analysis because they reflect 
repeated, face-to-face social interactions and connections both within and across networks that are 
likely to promote cooperation and reinforce the attendant norms of the networks (Coleman, 1988; 
Putnam, 1995). On the other hand, the Pvote and the Respn measures are empirical proxies that 
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reasonably capture the manifestations of cooperative norms (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) since 
there are no legal or direct material incentives to vote or to take a census survey (Knack, 1992; 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004; Funk, 2010).   
Following Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2006) and Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 
(2017a, b), we construct the test variable, Social capital, using the first principal component from 
a factor analysis based on Pvote, Respn, Nccs, and Assn. We can only directly estimate Social 
capital in 1990, 1997, 2005, and 2009. Accordingly, we follow Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
and Hilary and Hui (2009) to backfill data for the missing years using estimates of Social capital 
in the preceding year in which data are available. For example, we fill in missing data from 1998 
to 2004 using Social capital in 1997. 
3.3. Baseline regression models 
We use the following empirical specification to test the implications of our hypothesis: 
Total payt+1 or Equity payt+1 = f (Social capitalt, CEO attributest, firm attributest, county 
     attributest, industry dummies, and year dummies).         (1) 
 
Total payt+1 and Equity payt+1 are as of year t+1. Social capitalt and control variables are as of year 
t. The extant evidence indicates a range of firm-level factors that potentially affect CEO 
compensation (e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013). Accordingly, 
we include a range of firm attributes to control for the effects of size, risk, leverage, asset tangibility, 
and growth opportunities; and, we control for the effects of CEO tenure, CEO age, and institutional 
ownership (both level and concentration). We also include accounting-based (return on assets) and 
stock-based (raw stock return) firm performance measures in the empirical models to control for 
the influences of managerial ability and luck on CEO pay.  
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The social capital construct could reflect influences arising from county-level attributes 
such as economic development, infrastructure quality, labor market quality, diversity in race, 
political preferences, and religious adherence (e.g., Putnam, 1995; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 
2002; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater, 2006). Accordingly, we include a range of county-level 
measures to control for the effects of income level, population growth, population density, latitude, 
longitude, distance to river, age, educational level, nonwhite population percentage, relative 
strength of Democratic/Republican party as captured by state election outcomes (Rubin, 2008), 
and the fraction of a county’s population that claims affiliation with an organized religion (Hilary 
and Hui, 2009). By doing so, one is more confident that the estimated coefficients on Social capitalt 
reflect residual variation in local social environment that is captured by the social capital construct 
and not explained by these other factors. Finally, we include dummy variables to control for 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry effects and year effects in the regression 
models. The industry dummies are intended to isolate the effect of regulatory environment on CEO 
compensation (Smith and Watts, 1982). The Appendix presents detailed definitions and 
constructions of all these variables. Hereafter, we omit the subscript to ease the exposition and 
refer to the aforementioned regression models as the baseline models. 
3.4.   Sampling procedure and summary statistics  
We estimate the baseline models using a data set constructed with information obtained 
from various sources. We begin with annual executive compensation data from the Compustat 
ExecuComp database in the two decades of 1993–2014 for which complete financial and stock 
price information is available in the Compustat and CRSP databases and institutional ownership 
data are available in the Thomson Reuters Ownership database. This limits our sample to those 
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firms in the Standard and Poor’s (SP) 1,500 universe in the period 1993–2014. We extract 
corporate headquarter locations using historical information in electronic 10-K filings from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) database. We use the resulting state and county names or Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) codes of each firm’s headquarter location to match social capital data 
from NRCRD and other data on county-level demographic factors from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and the US Census Bureau. The final data set contains 2,396 unique firms and 22,246 
firm-years in the period 1993–2014 for which all requisite data for regressions are available.  
Table 1 presents sample statistics for all variables used in the baseline regressions. On 
average, the levels of total compensation and equity-based compensation are $4.6 million and $2.6 
million, respectively. These sample statistics are in the range of those reported in prior studies. For 
example, Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) report mean values of $4.5 million and $2.5 million 
for total compensation and equity-based compensation, respectively. As expected, equity-based 
compensation constitutes a large proportion of the CEO’s total pay, roughly 56.7% in our sample 
(0.567=$2.612 million/$4.605 million). There are significant variations in the levels of social 
capital in our data; the standard deviation of Social capital is 0.834 with a mean of -0.441 and the 
corresponding interquartile range is between -1.127 and 0.168. Much of the variation in Social 
capital in the data comes from the differences in social capital across counties at a point in time; 
although the overtime changes in Social capital are nontrivial in our data, they dwarf the 
cross-sectional variations in Social capital.  
[Insert Table 1] 
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4.  Social capital and the levels of CEO compensation 
4.1.  Baseline regression results  
Table 2, Panel A, presents results of the baseline models using Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regressions with county-level clustered standard errors. The dependent variables are Total 
pay and Equity pay. The coefficients on Social capital are negative and significant at the 1% level. 
They are -0.064 and -0.147 in the regressions of Total pay and Equity pay, respectively. These 
findings are consistent with our hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 2] 
The relative magnitudes of the coefficients are informative; they show that social capital 
has a larger effect on the level of equity-based compensation. This empirical regularity is in line 
with our expectation as existing findings indicate that equity-based pay practices are particularly 
vulnerable to managerial influences (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002). 
Based on the Social capital estimates in the baseline regressions, an interquartile increase in Social 
capital from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in our data would reduce Equity pay by 0.190 
(0.190=0.147×1.295) and it would reduce Total pay by 0.083 (0.083=0.064×1.295). Since the 
mean values of CEO equity compensation and CEO total compensation are $2.612 and $4.606 
million in our sample, these results imply that an interquartile increase in Social capital, on average, 
reduces Equity pay by about 17.31% and it reduces Total pay by about 7.97%, respectively.3 By 
way of comparison, Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) find that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
                                                        
3 For Equity pay, an interquartile increase in Social capital reduces the level of CEO equity compensation to 
$2.160 million (where $2.160 million = exp(ln(1+2,612)-0.190)-1)×$1,000) relative to the mean level of $2.612 
million, reflecting a reduction of 17.31% in CEO equity compensation. Similarly, an interquartile increase in Social 
capital reduces CEO total compensation to $4.239 million (where $4.239 million = exp(ln(1+4,606)-0.083)-
1)×$1,000) relative to the mean level of $4.606 million, reflecting a 7.97% decline in CEO total compensation.   
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CEO power index, as captured by CEO personal influence over the board of directors, raises total 
CEO compensation by about 4.5% in their sample. Based on our estimates, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in Social capital reduces total CEO compensation by about 
5.17%.4 
Although not our focus, Panel B reports coefficients from baseline regressions using other 
compensation variables as the dependent variables, namely, Bonus, Salary, and Other pay. For 
brevity, we report the estimates on Social capital only. In these regressions, the coefficients on 
Social capital are negative in general, but significant at the 5% level only when Bonus is the 
dependent variable. The coefficient on Social capital is insignificant at the conventional level 
when either Salary or Other pay is the dependent variable.  
4.2.  Effects of preferences for redistribution, income inequality, and metropolitan setting 
The association between CEO compensation and social capital could be spurious if our 
baseline models omit factors that correlate with both CEO compensation and social capital. To 
allay this concern, we identify preferences for redistribution, income inequality, and metropolitan 
setting as specific omitted variables that could cause a negative association between CEO pay and 
social capital. Our results are robust and the estimated coefficients on social capital do not attenuate 
significantly when we control for these factors in the regressions.  
                                                        
4 These data might overstate the effect of social capital on CEO compensation because Morse, Nanda, and 
Seru (2011) use a within-firm setting and we do not. To allay this concern, we perform a horse-race by re-estimating 
the regressions after adding a dummy variable, CEO power, to the baseline models. CEO power equals one if a firm’s 
CEO also serves as the chairperson of the board and president of the company in a given year; CEO power equals zero 
otherwise. Based on the estimated coefficients from this specification, a one-standard-deviation increase in Social 
capital reduces CEO total compensation by 5.22% and the corresponding change in CEO power increases CEO total 
compensation by 4.75%. The results from this regression are not tabulated. 
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Preferences for redistribution vary systematically across countries and across local 
communities within a nation (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). 
Yamamura (2012) finds that people in local communities in Japan with higher social capital also 
exhibit stronger preferences for redistribution. Individuals tend to have strong redistribution 
preferences when they have low social mobility, anticipate low future income prospects, and doubt 
the fairness of social competition, namely, when people are dubious that it is hard work, rather 
than luck, birth, connections, and/or corruption, that affects income (Benabou and Ok, 2001; 
Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Accordingly, preferences for redistribution could be negatively 
associated with levels of CEO pay.  
We use survey data from American National Election Studies (ANES) to measure people’s 
preferences for redistribution. The data are based on each respondent’s answer to question 
VCF0809 from the ANES surveys: “Some people feel that the government in Washington should 
see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. (Suppose these people are at one 
end of a scale, at point 1.) Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on 
his/their own. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other 
people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.) Where would you place 
yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” We code the data so that a higher 
number means a respondent is more favorable to redistribution.  
In the sampling period for our analysis, ANES conducted biennial surveys in US counties 
from 1994 to 2012, except for the years of 2006 and 2010. However, ANES did not survey all the 
counties and ANES conducted only one survey in 53% (or 206 out of 390) of the counties in our 
sample. This makes it difficult to obtain a meaningful time-varying county-level measure for 
  20 
redistribution preferences. Accordingly, we use the variable, County redistribution preferences, to 
capture time-invariant county-level preferences for redistribution. County redistribution 
preferences is the mean of ANES respondent data in a given county across all years in which 
ANES conducted a survey in the county.   
We re-estimate the regressions after adding this omitted variable to the baseline models. 
Table 3, Panel A, presents the results. For brevity, we report the estimates on Social capital and 
the respective omitted variable only; we continue this reporting practice for the remainder of Table 
3. Across the models, the estimates on County redistribution preferences are negative but 
insignificant. In contrast, the estimates on Social capital remain negative and significant at the 1% 
level. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Income inequality is negatively associated with social capital (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000; Putnam, 2001; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater, 2006). However, the pay levels of local 
CEOs residing in a county are likely to widen the income gap in that county, possibly resulting in 
a positive association between income inequality and CEO pay. Accordingly, we use Gini 
coefficients to capture income inequality at the county-year level. The variable, Income inequality, 
is based on annual estimates of Gini coefficients for US counties from 2006 to 2014 as reported in 
the American Community Survey (Variable B19083). We backfill data for the missing years using 
estimates of Gini coefficients in 2006. 
Firms located in metropolitan areas could enjoy significant agglomeration benefits 
including lower transportation costs, lower communication costs, and increased efficiency (e.g., 
Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Glaeser, 2010). This could result in higher CEO compensation. However, 
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Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2006) find that metropolitan setting (i.e., major cities and 
their surrounding suburban localities) is associated with lower levels of social capital even after 
controlling for other demographic characteristics such as education, age, income, etc. Accordingly, 
we use the variable, Metro, to isolate the effects associated with metropolitan setting. Metro is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s corporate headquarter is located within a 250-kilometer 
radius of a metropolitan statistical area with more than one million residents according to the 
census of 2010; it equals zero otherwise.  
Table 3, Panel A, presents the results from the regressions after adding the respective 
omitted variable to the baseline models. Across the models, the estimates on Income inequality 
and Metro are insignificant, except for the estimate on Metro in the regression where Total pay is 
the dependent variable. Nevertheless, estimates on Social capital remain negative and significant 
at the 5% level or better across the models, suggesting that the baseline regressions are not 
significantly plagued by these omitted factors.5  
4.3.  Effects of other omitted variables 
Still, our empirical models might omit unknown (and therefore omitted) regional or state 
characteristics that affect social capital and CEO pay. We use region fixed effect regressions and 
state fixed effect regressions to examine the influences of unknown region-level and state-level 
factors that are relatively stable overtime. Table 3, Panel B, presents the results. In these models, 
we re-estimate the regressions after adding region fixed effects and state fixed effects to the 
baseline models, respectively. Across the models, the estimates on Social capital remain negative 
                                                        
5 The estimates on the omitted factors are generally insignificant. This empirical regularity might be due to 
the fact that we have already included a range of county-level control variables in the baseline model. 
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and significant at the 5% level or better, suggesting that the baseline models are not plagued by 
significant omitted time-invariant region-level or state-level factors. 
Both social capital and levels of CEO compensation are relatively stable and sticky over 
time. As such, county fixed effect and firm fixed effect regressions would likely absorb most of 
the variations in these variables, making it extremely difficult to detect a relation between social 
capital and CEO pay even if one exists. Accordingly, we employ alternate approaches to establish 
the robustness of our findings with respect to omitted county-level and firm-level factors. 
For omitted county-level factors, we use the variable, Other total pay (Other equity pay), 
which we calculate using the mean value of Total pay (Equity pay) for other S&P 1500 firms 
headquartered in the same county in a given year. The idea is to capture influences of unknown 
county-level factors affecting CEO pay that change over time. We add Other total pay and Other 
equity pay to the baseline model separately and re-estimate the regressions accordingly. Table 3, 
Panel C, presents the results. Across the models, the estimates on Social capital remain negative 
and significant at the 1% level when the dependent variable is Total pay. The estimate is significant 
at the 10% level when Equity pay is the dependent variable (p-value = 0.08). These findings 
suggest that the baseline models are not plagued by significant unknown county-level factors 
affecting CEO compensation. 
For omitted firm-level factors, we use the variable, E-Index, to capture influences of 
corporate governance arising from anti-takeover provisions and charter amendments that firms 
adopted.6 The idea is to capture influences of firm-level corporate governance quality on CEO pay. 
                                                        
6 E-Index is an index that captures managerial entrenchment proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). 
It is the total number of anti-takeover provisions a firm has in a given year, including staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and 
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Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) find that E-Index is monotonically associated with 
economically significant reductions in firm valuation and large negative abnormal returns, 
suggesting that anti-takeover provisions reflect poor corporate governance. For omitted 
executive-level factors, we use the variable, General ability, to capture influences of general 
managerial skills.7 Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) find that General ability is positively and 
significantly related to CEO pay levels.  
We add E-Index and General ability to the baseline models separately and re-estimate the 
regressions accordingly. The remainder of Table 3, Panel C, reports the corresponding results. 
Across the models, the estimates on E-Index and General ability are positive and significant at the 
1% level, possibly reflecting the influences of firm-level anti-takeover protection and 
executive-level general managerial ability on CEO pay. Nevertheless, the estimates on Social 
capital remain negative and significant at the 1% level in most of the regressions, except in the 
Equity pay regression where General ability is added to the model in which the estimate on Social 
capital is negative and significant at the 5% level. These findings suggest that the baseline models 
are robust to influences of these firm-level and executive-level factors.8 
4.4. Sensitivity to alternate measure and alternate sampling method  
                                                        
charter amendments. We thank Professor Bebchuk for providing the data. The requisite E-index data are from 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml which provides coverage up to 2006. 
7 General ability is the first factor of the principal components analysis based on five measures. These 
measures capture prior work experience for a given CEO before her current CEO position. The five aspects captured 
include the number of unique positions, the number of unique firms, and the number of unique industries in which a 
given CEO worked in the past plus whether she held a CEO position prior to her current CEO position and whether 
she worked for a multi-divisional firm prior to her current CEO position. The requisite data are from 
https://sites.google.com/site/claudiapcustodio/research, which provides coverage for CEOs of S&P 1500 firms from 
1993 through 2007. We thank Professor Custodio for providing the data. 
8 Our results are also robust to adding CRSP closing bid-ask spread to isolate the effect of stock market 
liquidity (Chung and Zhang, 2014) on executive compensation (e.g., Jayaraman and Milbourn, 2011). These results 
are not tabulated.   
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We use Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) data on general election voter 
turnout to construct an alternate measure for social capital. The variable of choice is 
vv_turnout_gvm, which contains self-reported data of voting behavior for each respondent (voted 
= 1, did not vote = 0). This variable could capture the strength of civic norms in the local area and 
reflect the influences arising from social capital. The requisite data are from 
http://cces.gov.harvard.edu/pages/welcome-cooperative-congressional-election-study. CCES 
surveys were conducted in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 during our sample period. For 
observations before 2006, we use CCES 2006 data to backfill missing observations.  Specifically, 
we compute the variable, CCES self-reported voter turnout, using the county-level average of the 
vv_turnout_gvm variable; and, we re-estimate the regression models after replacing Social capital 
with CCES self-reported voter turnout. The first two columns of Table 3, Panel D, report the results 
from this analysis. The coefficients on CCES self-reported voter turnout are negative and 
significant with p-values equal to 0.06 or better, indicating that our results are robust to using the 
CCES voter turnout measure as an alternate proxy for social capital.9 
Because of data limitations in NRCRD, we construct Social capital using the backfilling 
method. This method could overstate the significance of the estimates. We perform two analyses 
to ease this concern. First, as do Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) and Hilary and Hui (2009), we 
estimate the regressions using linearly interpolated social capital data that involve generating the 
values in the missing years by linear approximation. Second, we perform regressions using only 
                                                        
9 Our results are also robust to another alternative measure of social capital using county-level blood donation 
data from the DDB Life Style Survey, which covers the period 1992–1994. Specifically, we re-estimate the baseline 
models after replacing Social capital with the dummy variable, High blood donation, which equals one if a county’s 
average blood donation rate in 1992–1994 ranks in the top quartile and equals zero otherwise. These results are not 
tabulated.  
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the three years in which data on social capital are actually available in the NRCRD, namely, 1997, 
2005, and 2009. The reduced sample contains 3,851 firm-year observations. Table 3, Panel D, 
reports the results from the baseline regression model based on these approaches. Across the 
models, the coefficients on Linearly interpolated social capital and Social capital are negative and 
generally significant at better than the 1% level, indicating that the backfilling method does not 
excessively overstate the significance of the baseline regression estimates.  
We use county-level clustered standard errors in our estimations to ease the concern that 
correlation of CEO pay practices among firms co-located in the same county might overstate the 
significance of the estimates in the baseline regressions. We provide evidence to further mitigate 
this concern by analyzing data at the county-year level. Specifically, we calculate the mean values 
of all firm-level variables based on firms located in the same county in a given year. We estimate 
the regressions using these county-level variables in place of the corresponding firm-level 
variables. We drop industry dummies from this revised regression specification because it is not 
meaningful to use average values based on industry dummies. Table 3, Panel E, reports results 
from these regressions. The sample in this analysis contains 390 unique counties with 5,549 
county-year observations. Across the models, the coefficients on Social capital remain negative 
and significant at the 1% level.  
4.5.  Regression results using inherited cultural preferences as instruments for social capital 
Reverse causality could make it challenging to infer a causal relation between social capital 
and CEO pay. However, culture is likely transmitted across generations, and individuals are likely 
influenced by cultural preferences that they inherit from their ancestral origins (e.g., Becker, 1996; 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006). Accordingly, we use an epidemiological approach (e.g., 
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Guiso Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Fernández, 2011; Luttmer and 
Singhal, 2011) to construct instruments for social capital based on cultural preferences from 
people’s respective countries of ancestry, namely, inherited cultural preferences. This approach is 
advantageous because the corresponding instruments are likely unaffected by reverse causality.  
There is substantial evidence of cultural persistence: that the parent’s attitudes, values, and 
behaviors are good predictors of the attitudes, values, and behaviors of children (e.g., Fernández, 
Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Based on this logic, 
we use ancestry data from the Census Bureau and two specific Hofstede’s scores of national culture, 
namely, power distance and masculinity-femininity, to construct our instruments for social capital. 
The Hofstede’s score data are mainly from https://harzing.com/download/hgindices.xls, which we 
supplement with additional data from https://www.hofstede-insights.com. Census ancestry data 
report the first ancestry of people residing in each county (Fernández, 2007), which we use to 
calculate the percentages of peoples’ countries of ancestry within a county. We then construct the 
instrumental variable, Power distance (Masculinity-femininity), using a weighted average method 
that combines these percentages with the Hofstede’s scores for power distance (masculinity-
femininity) based on people’s respective countries of ancestry.  
Putnam (2001) observes that US states with greater tolerance for equality have higher 
social capital, concluding that social capital and tolerance for equality “go together.” Accordingly, 
we expect that power distance is negatively associated with social capital because power distance 
reflects an attitude toward greater tolerance for inequality among people (Hofstede, 2003). 
Masculinity-femininity measures the relative strength of masculine social values against feminine 
social values, where masculine values emphasize the importance of material success and feminine 
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values emphasize the importance of building relationships with people and helping others 
(Hofstede, 2003). Given that “social capital exists in the relation among persons” (Coleman, 1988, 
p. S100), our conjecture is that masculinity-femininity is negatively associated with social capital.  
In our setting, a valid instrument should correlate with social capital. We find evidence that 
our instruments satisfy this requirement. Model 1 in Table 4 reports the results. In this regression, 
the dependent variable is Social capital and independent variables include Power distance, 
Masculinity-femininity, and all control variables as specified in the baseline model. The 
coefficients on Power distance and Masculinity-femininity are negative and significant at the 1% 
level. Moreover, the Angrist-Pischke (2009) F-statistic for weak instruments is significant at the 
1% level, suggesting that the instruments are not weak.   
[Insert Table 4] 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 4 report the second-stage regression results. We continue to use 
the baseline models for these regressions, except that we replace Social capital with Fitted social 
capital, where the latter is generated from estimates in the first-stage regression. Across the models, 
the coefficients on Fitted social capital remain negative and retain their significance at either the 
1% level or the 10% level (p-value = 0.08). Given the epidemiological design, these findings offer 
plausible causal evidence of social capital’s effect on CEO compensation.  
4.6. Results from propensity score matched sample 
Nevertheless, if corporate headquarter location decision is endogenous, social capital could 
be endogenous too. We use the propensity score matched technique to mitigate this concern. 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide a useful survey of this method. In our case, the idea is to 
compare CEO compensation in a treatment group against a control group, where treatments are 
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firms located in a county with a high level of social capital and controls are firms with comparable 
propensity of locating in a high-social-capital county based on firm fundamentals but are actually 
located in a county with a lower level of social capital.  
Specifically, from 1993 to 2014, we rank Social capital annually based on the data in that 
year; and, we classify those firm-years in the top quartile as treatment and those in the bottom 
quartile as control. For each treatment firm-year, the dummy variable, High social capital, equals 
one; for each control firm-year, High social capital equals zero. This procedure generates 5,562 
firm-years in the treatment group and a similar number of observations in the control group. 
Relying on this sample, we generate the propensity score by running a logistic regression with 
High social capital as the dependent variable; the independent variables include all variables as 
specified in the baseline model. We then match, without replacement, each treatment observation 
(High social capital = 1) with a unique control (High social capital = 0) using the closest 
propensity score. We use a caliper of 1% to find the closest match, where caliper refers to the 
difference in the predicted propensity scores between the treatment and match. Based on these 
procedures, we identify 787 matched pairs of treatment-control observations.  
Table 5, Panel A, presents results of the Student’s t-tests that compare firm and county 
attributes across treatment sample (High social capital = 1) and control sample (High social capital 
= 0). As expected, there is a significant difference in Social capital. The other results show no 
significant difference in any variable across the two samples, except for Population density which 
is significant at the 10% level.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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We explore the effect of the treatment against the counterfactual using the test sample that 
includes 1,574 firm-year observations, of which 787 firm-years are from the treatment firms and 
787 are from the control firms. As before, we use the baseline regression models; in this case, we 
modify the model by replacing Social capital with High social capital. This specification produces 
estimates on High social capital that capture the average treatment effects by comparing 
observations in firms headquartered in high-social-capital counties against observations in firms 
with comparable propensity scores but actually have headquarters located in counties with lower 
levels of social capital, holding other factors constant. Table 5, Panel B, reports the results. Across 
the models, estimates on High social capital remain positive and significant at better than the 10% 
level.  
4.7.  Corroborating evidence based on headquarter relocations 
Firms seldom relocate corporate headquarters and over-time variations in social capital 
dwarf cross-sectional variations in social capital in our data. This raises the concern that our results 
are primarily driven by cross-sectional variations in social capital. We provide evidence to allay 
this concern by analyzing the effects of over-time variations in social capital, focusing on those 
firms that relocated corporate headquarters to another county with a different level of social capital. 
Using a difference-in-differences method, we explore how over-time changes in social capital 
affect over-time changes in CEO compensation across firms that either experienced a 
social-capital-increasing relocation or a social-capital-decreasing relocation. 
Based on the sample of 2,396 unique firms in the main analysis, we identify 76 firms with 
either one social-capital-increasing relocation or one social-capital-decreasing relocation in the 
period 1996–2010 with at least three years of data before and three years of data after the relocation. 
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Of these 76 firms, there are 35 firms with a social-capital-increasing relocation event and 41 with 
a social-capital-decreasing relocation event, providing a total of 959 firm-years for the analysis. 
Of these observations, 421 firm-years are from the before-relocation period and 538 are from the 
after-relocation period.   
We re-estimate the baseline models after replacing Social capital with three variables, 
namely, Social-capital-increasing relocation, After, and the interaction variable, After × 
Social-capital-increasing relocation. Social-capital-increasing relocation is a dummy variable 
that equals one or zero depending on whether the firm relocated its headquarter to a county with a 
higher or lower level of social capital. After equals one or zero depending on whether the firm-year 
observation is from the period after or before the relocation.  
We are particularly keen on the coefficient of the interaction term because it provides an 
estimate of the difference in over-time changes in CEO compensation between firms that 
experienced a social-capital-increasing relocation and firms that experienced a 
social-capital-decreasing relocation across the two periods surrounding the relocation events. 
Table 6, Panel A, reports the results. Across the models, the coefficients on the interaction terms 
are negative and significant; it is significant at the 5% level for the Total pay regression (p-value 
= 0.03) and 10% level for the Equity pay regression (p-value = 0.09). These results show that 
changes in social capital over time can explain temporal changes in CEO compensation. More 
specifically, firms with a social-capital-increasing relocation display significantly larger temporal 
reduction in CEO compensation when compared to firms with a social-capital-decreasing 
relocation.  
[Insert Table 6] 
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We perform two tests to provide credence that the documented results are attributable to 
changes in social capital resulting from the relocation decisions. First, we test whether firm 
attributes in the subsample that experienced a social-capital-increasing relocation are comparable 
to those in the subsample that experienced a social-capital-decreasing relocation. In particular, we 
use the Student’s t-test to formally test whether firm attributes and CEO pay levels are different 
across these two groups of firms in the year immediately before relocation. Panel B of Table 6 
reports the results. The findings reveal no significant differences between the two groups of firms 
in any of the dimensions examined, except CEO age (p-value = 0.08). Second, we test whether 
changes in corporate strategies surrounding relocations are comparable across the two subsamples. 
If headquarter relocations are motivated by changing business conditions facing firms, one would 
expect to observe changes in corporate strategies surrounding relocation events. We capture 
strategies such as growth (market-to-book and firm size), capital structure (leverage), risk 
undertaking (return volatility), and diversification (number of segments). We find that the changes 
in these variables (i.e., market-to-book, firm size, leverage, return volatility, and number of 
segments) surrounding relocation events are not significantly different across the two groups of 
firms. These results are not tabulated.  
 
5.  Social capital and the power-pay relation 
So far, our results show a robust relation between social capital and CEO compensation, 
providing tentative evidence that social capital restrains managerial rent extraction in CEO 
compensation. In this section and the following section, we conduct additional analyses to pin 
down this inference. First, we follow Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) to examine how social 
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capital affects the positive relation between CEO power and CEO pay. Second, we follow 
Narayanan and Seyhun (2008), Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010), and Lie (2005) to examine 
the effects of social capital on incidences of CEO option grant awards that likely embody 
consequences of managerial rent extraction, including unscheduled awards, lucky awards, and 
backdated awards. 
Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) find that, on average, powerful CEOs extract higher 
compensation. Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) find that powerful CEOs weaken the effectiveness 
of incentive by rigging the weights used in these arrangements toward performance measures that 
are doing better. These findings are consistent with the managerial power approach put forth by 
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002), which implies a positive power-pay relation, namely, a 
positive relation between CEO power and levels of CEO pay. Our hypothesis maintains, and the 
results so far show that social capital is negatively associated with the levels of CEO pay. If these 
findings were to provide evidence of social capital’s disciplinary effect on managerial rent 
extraction in the CEO compensation setting, one would naturally predict that social capital 
weakens the accretive effect of CEO power on CEO pay. We examine this implication and provide 
corroborating evidence as follows.  
Following Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) and Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011), we 
use a CEO power measure that captures the CEO’s personal influence over the board of directors. 
The dummy variable, CEO power, equals one if a firm’s CEO also serves as the chairperson of the 
board and president of the company in a given year; CEO power equals zero otherwise. We modify 
the baseline model in two ways. First, we replace Social capital with a dummy variable, High SK, 
which specifically captures those firms headquartered in counties with higher levels of social 
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capital. High SK equals one if Social capital for a firm in a given year is higher than the sample 
median; it equals zero otherwise. Second, we add CEO power and the interaction term, CEO power 
× High SK, to the baseline model. In this specification, a negative coefficient on the interaction 
term is consistent with the notion that social capital weakens the accretive effect of CEO power on 
CEO compensation.  
Models 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 7 present estimates of the revised model. We also 
present the estimates of two alternate models, in Models 3 and 4, in which we drop the interaction 
term from the revised model. Across the models, the coefficients on CEO power are positive and 
significant, confirming that a positive power-pay relation exists in our data. More importantly, we 
find that the estimates on the interaction term in Models 1 and 2 are negative, as expected, and 
they are significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
[Insert Table 7] 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) and Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015) find that CEOs could 
exert greater personal influence over those board members who are appointed after the CEO 
assumed the office of CEO; hereafter, we refer to these board members as CEO appointed directors. 
Accordingly, we use an alternate measure of CEO power that captures the proportion of CEO 
appointed directors on a board in a given year. We obtain the requisite data on CEO appointed 
directors from Professor Lalitha Naveen; this sample is derived from the sample analyzed by Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2014). Based on these data, we construct the variable, % CEO appointed 
directors, which is the number of CEO appointed directors divided by the total number of board 
members for a firm in a given year. After merging these data into our sample, we obtain a final 
sample of 14,587 firm-year observations for the analysis. 
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We run the same regressions as those employed in Panel A of Table 7 after replacing CEO 
power with % CEO appointed directors. Table 7, Panel B, reports these results. Across the models, 
the coefficients on % CEO appointed directors are positive and significant at the 1% level. Again, 
the estimates on the interaction term in Models 1 and 2 are negative, as expected, and they are 
significant at the 5% level or better.  
  
6. Social capital and opportunistic timing in CEO option grant awards 
Equity-based compensation typically constitutes a large portion of the CEO’s total pay; 
and there is significant evidence that CEO option grant awards are especially vulnerable to 
managerial rent extraction (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002). More 
importantly, prior research identifies specific equity-based awards, such as unscheduled awards, 
lucky awards, and backdated awards, as opportunistic timing practices in CEO option grant awards 
that unduly favor CEOs. Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) find that firms can afford their CEOs with 
substantial latitude to “designate option grant dates to increase their compensation” through the 
use of unscheduled awards. Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2009) find that stock returns are 
generally negative before option grants but they are generally positive after option grants, 
suggesting that option awards could be backdated. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) find 
evidence that CEOs receive an abnormally high number of lucky grants; and, those CEOs who 
receive lucky grants also tend to have higher total compensation, even after controlling for other 
factors affecting compensation. Based on these findings, we use incidences of unscheduled awards, 
incidences of lucky awards, and incidences of backdated awards to capture exemplifications of 
various consequences of managerial rent extraction in CEO equity-based compensation practices. 
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Accordingly, we examine the extent to which social capital affects the likelihood that firms make 
each of these awards to their CEOs.    
6.1.  Measures of opportunistic timing  
A commonality of the aforementioned studies is the focus on at-the-money, unscheduled 
option grants awarded to CEOs. This focus is warranted because unscheduled grants are more 
susceptible to managerial influences when compared to awards that follow a roughly fixed timing 
pattern (e.g., Narayanan and Seyhun, 2008; Heron and Lie, 2009; Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 
2010). Accordingly, we focus all ensuing analyses on unscheduled option grant awards to CEOs. 
We define a scheduled award as an option grant award with the same grant date plus/minus one 
day of another grant awarded to the same CEO in the preceding year. We define all other awards 
as unscheduled.  
We use three measures to capture the consequences of opportunistic timing in CEO option 
grant awards. Because we conduct the main analysis at the firm-year level, we construct these 
measures at firm-year level as well. The variable, Unscheduled, equals one if a firm in a given year 
makes at least one unscheduled award to its CEO; otherwise, it equals zero. The variable, 
Backdated, equals one if the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of all unscheduled awards 
that a firm grants its CEO in a given year is at the top 30th percentile of CAR in the sample; 
otherwise, it equals zero. For a given award, we calculate CAR as the difference in cumulative 
daily stock price returns over two five-day windows, (-5, -1) and (+1, +5), straddling the date of 
the unscheduled award (day 0). The variable, Luck, equals one if a firm in a given year makes at 
least one unscheduled award to its CEO on a date that has the lowest price in the grant month. 
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We collect observations of option grant awards from the Thomson Financial Insider 
Trading database, which covers all insiders’ filings of equity transactions in Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144. 
We treat multiple awards to the same individual on the same day as one observation. An award is 
an event on a given date in which the CEO in a given company receives one or more option grants, 
where a CEO is an individual identified in the Thomson database as either the CEO or the President 
of the company (rolecode equal to CEO or P). The sample covers the time period 1993–2006. This 
is reasonable because the Securities and Exchange Commission issued revised rules that mandate 
new detailed disclosures of executive compensation practices in 2006, and prior studies examining 
opportunistic CEO option awards typically examine observations prior to 2006 (e.g., Heron and 
Lie, 2009; Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010). 
6.2.  Effects of social capital on incidences of unscheduled awards  
We are able to identify 11,149 firm-years with at least one unscheduled award in a given 
year (Unscheduled = 1) and 1,663 firm-years with no unscheduled award in a given year 
(Unscheduled = 0). We use this sample containing 12,812 (= 11,149 + 1,663) firm-years to 
examine the effect of social capital on the likelihood that a firm makes at least one unscheduled 
award to its CEO in a given year. We estimate coefficients of the baseline model using Probit 
regressions after replacing the dependent variable with the dummy variable, Unscheduled. Model 
1, Table 8, reports the results. The sample contains 8,508 firm-year observations. Sample attrition 
is due to missing observations in the two variables that capture CEO characteristics, namely, CEO 
tenure and CEO age.10 Model 2 presents the results from an alternate model that excludes these 
                                                        
10 To preserve observations, in the ensuing analyses, we use CEO age and CEO tenure information from the 
BoardEx database to supplement corresponding missing data in the ExecuComp database.    
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two variables; it uses the full sample of 12,812 firm-year observations. Across the models, the 
coefficients on Social capital are negative and significant at the 5% level or better. Based on 
coefficients in Model 2, the implied probability that a firm makes at least one unscheduled award 
to its CEO in a given year is 90.50% when Social capital is at the 25th percentile and other 
independent variables are evaluated at their respective mean values in the sample. The 
corresponding implied probability is 88.11% at the 75th percentile of Social capital. Accordingly, 
an interquartile increase in Social capital in the data reduces the likelihood of an unscheduled 
award by about 2.39% (2.39%=90.50% - 88.11%). By way of comparison, the corresponding 
unconditional likelihood in the sample is around 87.02% (87.02%=11,149 ÷ 12,812).  
[Insert Table 8] 
6.3.  Effects of social capital on option backdating  
As do Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2009), we focus on option backdating in unscheduled 
awards only. Using the 11,149 firm-years with at least one unscheduled award, we identify 3,207 
firm-years in which firms backdated CEO option awards (Backdated = 1) and 7,942 firm-years 
with CEO awards that are not backdated (Backdated = 0).  
We estimate the baseline regression model using Probit regressions after replacing the 
dependent variable with the dummy variable Backdated. Table 9, Model 1, reports the results. 
Model 2 presents the results using an alternate model based on the same revised specification after 
excluding the CEO tenure and CEO age variables from the model. Across these models, the 
coefficients on Social capital are negative and significant with p-values equal to 0.03 and 0.07, 
respectively. Based on the coefficients in Model 2, an interquartile increase in Social capital from 
the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in the data would reduce the likelihood that a firm makes 
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a backdated award to its CEO in a given year by about 1.89% (1.89%=24.85% - 22.96%) when 
other independent variables are evaluated at their respective mean values in the sample. This effect 
is sizable and economically meaningful as the unconditional likelihood of backdated awards in the 
sample is 29% (29%=3,207 ÷ 11,149).  
[Insert Table 9] 
6.4.  Effect of social capital on incidences of lucky awards 
We obtain firm-year level information to determine luck in CEO option awards from 
Professor Lucian Bebchuk. The data reflect the subset of the sample analyzed by Bebchuk, 
Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) that overlaps with our main sample. It contains 9,872 firm-years 
between 1996 and 2005 of which around 14% include at least one lucky CEO award; that is, the 
firm in that year is identified as giving at least one lucky award to the CEO (Luck = 1). As before, 
we replace the dependent variable of the baseline model with the variable of interest and 
re-estimate the revised model. In this case, the variable of interest is the dummy variable, Luck. 
Accordingly, we use Probit regressions to estimate the model. Model 1, Table 10, reports the 
results. Model 2 presents the results from an alternate model, which excludes CEO tenure and 
CEO age. Across the models, the coefficients on Social capital are negative and significant with 
p-values equal to 0.06 and 0.04, respectively. Based on the coefficients in Model 1, an interquartile 
increase in Social capital from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in the data would reduce 
the likelihood that a firm makes a lucky award to its CEO in a given year by about 2.52%. 
(2.52%=12.01% - 9.49%) when other independent variables are evaluated at their respective mean 
values in the sample. The implied reduction is sizable and economically meaningful as the 
unconditional likelihood of lucky awards in the sample is 14% in the entire sample.  
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[Insert Table 10] 
 
7.  Conclusion 
This study provides a novel analysis of the impact of social capital on one specific form of 
agency problem, namely, managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation. We capture broad 
consequences of managerial opportunism using the levels of CEO total pay and CEO equity-based 
pay. We capture opportunistic timing in CEO option awards using incidences of lucky awards, 
backdated awards, and unscheduled awards; these measures embody more specific forms of 
managerial opportunism in CEO compensation setting. The results indicate that firms 
headquartered in US counties with higher levels of social capital, as captured by strong cooperative 
norms and dense social networks, are less likely to make lucky awards, backdated awards, and 
unscheduled awards to their CEOs. And, the levels of CEO pay, both in total pay and in 
equity-based pay, are lower in these firms even after controlling for other factors that are known 
to affect CEO compensation. We interpret these findings as indicating that social capital deters 
managerial rent extraction in CEO pay. To fortify this interpretation, we provide corroborating 
evidence that a positive power-pay relation exists in our data and, more importantly, that social 
capital moderates this positive relation. Our social capital construct is specifically designed to 
capture secular, social influences arising from norms and networks in localities surrounding 
corporate headquarters. As such, the findings point to an important insight: that secular, social 
influences could constrain agency problems in corporations.  
The implications are quite broad. First, agency problems are pervasive in publicly listed 
corporations. If social capital constrains agency problems in CEO pay, it could also matter in other 
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settings where agency problems are significant. Second, there is emerging evidence that social 
capital matters in corporate decisions (e.g., Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang, 2017a; Hoi, Wu, Zhang, 
2017), in debt contracting (Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang, 2017b), and even in audit pricing (Jha and 
Chen, 2015). Taken together, these findings indicate that it is fruitful to explore the impact of 
social capital and, more broadly, other social factors in the corporate setting.  
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Appendix 
Variable definition and measurement 
This appendix presents definitions of the variables in the baseline regression model. Data for executive 
compensation are from Standard and Poor’s Compustat ExecuComp database. Data for firm attributes are from 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database and CRSP database. Data for institutional ownership are from Thomson 
Reuters Ownership database. Social capital data are from the Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development 
(NRCRD) at the Pennsylvania State University. The county-level demographic data are from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, the US Census Bureau, and the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA). 
Variable Definition 
Measures of executive compensation in year t+1 (dependent variables for baseline regressions): 
Total pay 
 
Logarithm of one plus total compensation for a CEO (CEO total pay as reported in 




Logarithm of one plus equity-based compensation for a CEO (CEO equity pay as reported 




Logarithm of one plus salary received by a CEO (CEO cash salary as reported in 




Logarithm of one plus cash bonus received by a CEO (CEO cash bonus as reported in 






Logarithm of one plus the sum of long-term performance payout in incentive plans 
(before 2006), deferred compensation (after 2006), contribution to retirement plan, 
perquisites, change-in-control payments, other personal benefits, etc. (CEO other pay as 
reported in ExecuComp ) in a given year.  
  





First principal component from a factor analysis based on Pvote, Respn, Nccs, and Assn 
data from NRCRD. Pvote reports voter turnouts in presidential elections. Respn reports 
response rates in US census surveys. Assn is the total numbers of ten types of social 
organizations. Nccs is the total numbers of nonprofit organizations. 
  
Control variables in year t: 
CEO age Age of the CEO. 
  
CEO tenure Number of years since a CEO has been a CEO for the firm.  
  
IO total Fraction of a firm’s shares held by institutional investors.  
  
IO concentration Sum of the squares of the fraction of shares held by each institutional investor. 
  
Firm size Logarithm of total sales for a firm in a year. 
  
Return Average monthly return for a stock in a year. 
  
Return volatility Standard deviation of monthly returns for a stock in a year.  
  
ROA Return on assets for a firm in a given year. 
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M/B Ratio of market value of assets scaled by book value of assets. 
  
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities (DLC + DLTT) scaled by total assets. 
  
Cash  Ratio of cash and marketable securities divided by total assets. 
  
CAPEX Ratio of capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
  
County income Median per capita household income (in thousands $) in a county during a year. 
  




Percentage of people 25 years old and above with at least one year of college in a county 




Fraction of a county’s residents that claim affiliation with an organized religion in a given 






Relative strength of Democratic/Republican party as manifested in electoral outcomes in 
states where the firm is headquartered. See Rubin (2008) and Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2013) 
for more information. The electoral outcome data are obtained from 
http://thegreenpapers.com. 
  
Population growth  Rate of change in a county’s population for the past year.  
  
Nonwhite population  One minus the fraction of a county’s residents reported as white in US Census. 
  
Population density Ratio of the number of residents (in 1,000s) per square mile of land area in the county.  
  
Latitude Latitude of the county in which a firm’s headquarter is located. 
  
Longitude Longitude of the county in which a firm’s headquarter is located. 
  




Closest distance between a firm’s headquarter location and the main stream of the ten 
longest rivers in the US, including Missouri River, Mississippi River, Yukon River, Rio 
Grande, Colorado River, Arkansas River, Columbia River, Red River, Snake River, and 




An indicator that equals one if a firm’s CEO also serves as the chairperson of the board 
and president of the company in a given year, and equals zero otherwise. 
  
% CEO appointed 
director  
The number of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office divided by the total 
number of directors on the board for a firm in a year. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
The sample contains 22,246 firm-year observations during 1993–2014. Compensation data are from the 
ExecuComp database. Total pay is the natural logarithm of one plus total compensation for a CEO during a given year 
(CEO total pay) as reported in ExecuComp. Equity pay is the natural logarithm of one plus equity-based compensation 
for a CEO in a given year (CEO equity pay) as reported in ExecuComp, which mainly consists of restricted stocks and 
option grants. Social capital is an estimate of a county’s social capital index based on data from the Northeast Regional 
Center for Rural Development (NRCRD) at the Pennsylvania State University. Other variables are defined in the 
Appendix.   
   
Variables N Mean S.D. 25th  Median 75th  
Total pay  22,246 7.9396 1.0264 7.2079 7.9580 8.6810 
Equity pay 22,246 6.2304 2.8961 5.7688 7.1414 8.1312 
Salary 22,246 6.4462 0.4955 6.1373 6.4881 6.8163 
Bonus 22,246 3.0983 3.1663 0.00 2.9246 6.2166 
Other pay 22,246 4.9266 2.5190 3.0350 5.3210 6.9955 
Social capital 22,246 -0.4408 0.8339 -1.1273 -0.3892 0.1677 
CEO age 22,246 55.57 7.34 51.00 56.00 60.00 
CEO tenure 22,246 7.4028 7.44 2.0000 5.0000 10.00 
IO concentration 22,246 0.0283 0.0368 0.0142 0.0233 0.0347 
IO total 22,246 0.7051 0.2170 0.5676 0.7374 0.8758 
Firm size 22,246 7.1459 1.5327 6.1384 7.1140 8.2426 
Return 22,246 0.0137 0.0359 -0.0048 0.0133 0.0313 
Return volatility 22,246 0.1110 0.0658 0.0662 0.0946 0.1361 
ROA 22,246 0.0427 0.1038 0.0156 0.0490 0.0905 
M/B 22,246 1.9653 1.2886 1.1660 1.5233 2.2295 
Leverage 22,246 0.2234 0.1837 0.0579 0.2059 0.3426 
Cash 22,246 0.1465 0.1733 0.0219 0.0748 0.2099 
CAPEX 22,246 0.0534 0.0529 0.0188 0.0386 0.0700 
County income  22,246 42.4760 16.1107 31.6130 39.4710 49.2600 
County age 22,246 34.3856 2.3209 32.00 34.00 36.00 
Education 22,246 32.3009 10.2392 25.20 30.80 40.30 
Religiosity 22,246 0.5412 0.1182 0.4413 0.5434 0.6316 
Political strength 22,246 3.3235 75.6292 -67.00 50.00 75.00 
Population growth 22,246 0.0094 0.0105 0.0026 0.0076 0.0141 
Nonwhite population 22,246 0.2248 0.1214 0.1353 0.2165 0.3151 
Population density 22,246 3.9517 10.3129 0.6531 1.2916 2.1017 
Latitude 22,246 38.5682 4.4860 35.1228 39.9642 41.7051 
Longitude 22,246 -91.4769 17.0384 -97.5601 -86.8210 -76.6777 
Distance to river 22,246 213.80 159.71 86.10 193.60 317.20 
CEO power   22,246 0.2655 0.4416 0.0000 0.0000 1.00 
% CEO appointed directors  14,587 0.4701 0.3186 0.2000 0.4286 0.7272 
Summary statistics of CEO compensation data from ExecuComp 
CEO total pay (in $1,000) 22,246 4605.92 4946.17 1349.05 2857.45 5889.05 
CEO equity pay (in $1,000) 22,246 2612.24 3543.93 319.15 1262.23 3398.02 
CEO cash salary (in $1,000) 22,246 704.01 319.44 461.78 656.25 911.63 
CEO cash bonus (in $1,000) 22,246 398.22 712.58 0.00 17.63 500.00 
CEO other pay (in $1,000) 22,246 944.55 1815.55 19.80 203.59 1090.67 
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Table 2 
Baseline regressions 
The sample contains 22,246 firm-year observations during 1993–2014. Regression models are as specified 
in the baseline models in Eq. (1). Total pay (Equity pay) is the logarithm of one plus total compensation (equity-based 
compensation) for a CEO during a given year as reported in the ExecuComp database. Social capital is a county-level 
social capital index based on data from the NRCRD at the Pennsylvania State University. Other variables, including 
other compensation variables (i.e., Salary, Bonus, and Other pay), are defined in the Appendix. In Panel B, control 
variables include all firm-level and county-level variables plus industry and year fixed effects as reported in Panel A. 
Estimates are based on ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
within-county clustering. t-statistics, in  parentheses, are based on two-sided tests. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Social capital and total/equity CEO pay 
Variables Total pay Equity pay 
Social capital -0.0637*** -0.1468*** 
 (-4.25) (-2.69) 
CEO age -0.0002 -0.0150*** 
 (-0.15) (-3.06) 
CEO tenure -0.0060*** -0.0407*** 
 (-3.25) (-7.59) 
IO concentration -1.7761*** -5.8941*** 
 (-4.38) (-5.84) 
IO total 0.7024*** 2.3264*** 
 (9.82) (11.07) 
Firm size 0.4266*** 0.5709*** 
 (34.85) (16.04) 
Return 2.4469*** 2.8610*** 
 (12.65) (4.01) 
Return volatility -0.3223* -0.7415 
 (-1.89) (-1.28) 
ROA -0.5934*** -1.3942*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.37) 
M/B 0.0988*** 0.1726*** 
 (8.90) (4.27) 
Leverage 0.1902*** -0.0054 
 (3.17) (-0.03) 
Cash 0.5045*** 0.4115 
 (5.48) (1.42) 
CAPEX -0.1461 0.7755 
 (-0.65) (1.29) 
County income 0.0024 0.0015 
 (1.11) (0.18) 
County age 0.0102 0.0319 
 (1.50) (1.43) 
Education 0.0042* 0.0086 
 (1.94) (1.03) 
Religiosity 0.1370 0.1240 
 (1.26) (0.37) 
Political strength 0.0001 -0.0005 
 (0.42) (-0.83) 
Population growth -2.4523** -3.8630 
 (-2.18) (-1.05) 
Nonwhite population 0.2385** 0.5094* 
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 (2.48) (1.92) 
Population density -0.0004 -0.0046 
 (-0.29) (-0.75) 
Latitude -0.0051 0.0019 
 (-1.31) (0.16) 
Longitude 0.0002 -0.0017 
 (0.26) (-0.60) 
Distance to river 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.93) (0.68) 
   
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5333 0.2307 
Number of observations 22,246 22,246 
   
Panel B: Social capital and other components of CEO pay 
Variables Salary Bonus Other pay 
Social capital -0.0061 -0.1011** 0.0317 
 (-0.53) (-1.97) (0.68) 
All control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5630 0.3950 0.3321 
Number of observations 22,246 22,246 22,246 
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Table 3 
Omitted variables and other sensitivity analyses 
The sample contains 22,246 firm-year observations during 1993–2014. Total pay (Equity pay) is the 
logarithm of one plus total compensation (equity-based compensation) for a CEO during a given year as reported in 
the ExecuComp database. Regressions are based on the baseline models of Eq. (1) with modifications as specified 
below. Panel A presents estimates of regressions after adding omitted variables for preferences for redistribution, 
income inequality, and metropolitan setting. County redistribution preferences is the mean of ANES respondent data 
for question VCF0809 for a given county across all years in which ANES conducted a survey in the county. We code 
the data such that a higher number means that a respondent is more favorable to redistribution. Income inequality is 
Gini coefficients for US counties from 2006 to 2014 as reported in the American Community Survey (Variable 
B19083). Data for the missing years before 2006 are filled in using year 2006 data.  Metro equals one if a firm’s 
headquarter is located within a 250-kilometer radius of a metropolitan statistical area with more than one million 
residents according to the 2010 census; Metro equals zero otherwise. Panel B presents estimates of regressions with 
region fixed effects and state fixed effects, where the regions as defined by the Census Bureau, including New England, 
Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, 
Mountain, and Pacific areas. Panel C presents estimates of regressions with added county-level, firm-level, and 
executive-level controls. Other total pay (Other equity pay) is the mean of Total pay (Equity pay) for other firms 
headquartered in the same county in a given year. E-Index is the total number of anti-takeover provisions a firm has 
in a given year, including staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, 
and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009).  General 
ability is the first factor of the principal components analysis of five proxies of a given CEO’s general managerial 
skills (Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013). These proxies include past number of (1) positions, (2) firms, and (3) 
industries in which a CEO worked; (4) whether the CEO held a CEO position at a different company; and (5) whether 
the CEO worked for a conglomerate. Panel D presents regression results based on alternative social capital measures 
and alternate sampling methods. CCES self-reported voter turnout is the county-level average of the vv_turnout_gvm 
variable provided by the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), which contains self-reported voting 
turnout data for each respondent (voted = 1, did not vote = 0). CCES conducted surveys in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 
and 2014. We backfill data for the missing years using CCES self-reported voter turnout measure in the preceding 
year in which data are available and we backfill missing observations before 2006 using CCES data in 2006. Linearly 
interpolated social capital uses a linear interpolation method to generate data for social capital in missing years. The 
last two columns of Panel D present regressions using a reduced sample for which data on social capital are actually 
available in the NRCRD, i.e., 1997, 2005, and 2009.  Panel E reports regressions using the county-level average values 
of the variables.  Across all panels and in all regressions, control variables include CEO age, CEO tenure, IO 
concentration, IO total, Firm size, Return, Return volatility, ROA, M/B, Leverage, Cash, CAPEX, County income, 
County age, Education, Religiosity, Political strength, Population growth, Nonwhite population, Population density, 
Latitude, Longitude, and Distance to river plus industry and year fixed effects as specified in the baseline models. All 
of these variables are defined in the Appendix. Estimates are based on ordinary least squares regressions with standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-county clustering. t-statistics, in  parentheses, are based on two-sided 
tests. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.    
  
  53 
Variables Total pay Equity pay Total pay Equity pay Total pay Equity pay 
Panel A: Effects of preferences for redistribution, income inequality, and metropolitan setting 
Social capital -0.0529*** -0.1669*** -0.0564*** -0.1342** -0.0459*** -0.1184** 







    
Income inequality   0.0389 -2.1007   
   (0.10) (-1.58)   
Metro     0.0802*** 0.1286 
     (3.09) (1.56) 
All control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5234 0.2255 0.5290 0.2266 0.5330 0.2309 
Number of observations 20,083 20,083 21,486 21,486 22,246 22,246 
 
Panel B: Region fixed effect regressions and state fixed effect regressions 
Social capital -0.0525*** -0.1223** -0.0296** -0.1563**   
 (-3.12) (-1.97) (-2.49) (-2.18)   
All control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Region fixed effect Yes Yes     
State fixed effect   Yes Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.5317 0.2270 0.5357 0.2273   
Number of observations 22,246 22,246 22,246 22,246   
 
Panel C: County-level and firm-level omitted factors 
Social capital -0.0435*** -0.0940* -0.0749*** -0.1789*** -0.0741*** -0.1376** 
 (-3.22) (-1.74) (-4.35) (-3.14) (-4.12) (-2.07) 
Other total pay 0.0223**      
 (2.05)      
Other equity pay  0.0126     
  (0.68)     
E-index   0.0319*** 0.1367***   
   (3.62) (4.55)   
General ability     0.0963*** 0.1529*** 
     (8.63) (4.17) 
All control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5225 0.2217 0.5423 0.2423 0.5123 0.2036 
Number of observations 19,755 19,755 17,803 17,803 13,208 13,208 
 
Panel D: Alternate social capital measures and alternate sampling method 






    
Linearly interpolated social 
capital 





     -0.0753*** -0.2068*** 
Social capital     (-4.00) (-2.77) 
All control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5291 0.2257 0.5118 0.2143 0.5619 0.2658 
Number of observations 21,894 21,894 16,891 16,891 3,851 3,851 
 
Panel E: Using county-averages variables 
Social capital -0.1142*** -0.3062***     
 (-3.53) (-2.80)     
All control variables Yes Yes     
Adjusted R2 0.5778 0.3033     
Number of observations 5,549 5,549     
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Table 4 
Regressions with instruments for social capital based on inherited cultural preferences 
The sample contains 22,246 firm-year observations for the period 1993–2014. Model 1 presents estimates 
from the first-stage regression, where the dependent variable is Social capital and the instruments, namely, Power 
distance and Masculinity-femininity, are added to the baseline models. Social capital is the county-level social capital 
index based on data from the NRCRD at the Pennsylvania State University. Power distance (masculinity-femininity) 
is the county-level weighted average Hofstede’s scores for power distance (masculinity-femininity), where the weights 
are the percentages of people with first ancestry information as reported in Census ancestry data. Models 2 and 3 
present estimates from the second-stage regression. Total pay (Equity pay) is the natural logarithm of one plus total 
compensation (equity-based compensation) for a CEO during a given year as reported in the ExecuComp database. 
Fitted social capital is the predicted value of social capital based on the first-stage regression. Control variables 
include CEO age, CEO tenure, IO concentration, IO total, Firm size, Return, Return volatility, ROA, M/B, Leverage, 
Cash, CAPEX, County income, County age, Education, Religiosity, Political strength, Population growth, Nonwhite 
population, Population density, Latitude, Longitude, and Distance to river plus industry and year fixed effects as 
specified in the baseline models. All of these variables are defined in the Appendix. Estimates are based on ordinary 
least squares regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the county-level. t-
statistics, in parentheses, are based on two-sided tests. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, 
**, and ***, respectively.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Social capital Total pay Equity pay 
    
Power distance -0.0612***   
 (-4.47)   
Masculinity-femininity -0.0507***   
 (-8.07)   
Fitted social capital  -0.1599*** -0.2324* 
  (-3.26) (-1.73) 
All control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.7041 0.5311 0.2305 
Number of observations 22,246 22,246 22,246 
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Table 5 
Regressions based on a propensity score matched sample 
The sample contains 1,574 treatment-control firm-year observations from 787 matched pairs for the period 
1993–2014. A propensity score matched method is used to generate the sample. We rank Social capital annually based 
on the data in that year. High social capital equals one if Social capital for a firm in a given year ranks at the top 
quartile in that year; High social capital equals zero if Social capital for a firm in a given year ranks at the bottom 
quartile in that year. To generate the propensity score, we use a logistic regression with High social capital as the 
dependent variable and independent variables as specified in the baseline model. Using the predicted propensity score 
from this logistic regression, we match without replacement a firm-year observation with High social capital equal to 
one, a treatment observation, against another firm-year observation with High social capital equal to zero, a control 
observation. We use the caliper matching method and match within a caliper of 0.01, where caliper refers to the 
difference in the predicted probabilities between the treatment observation and the control observation. Panel A 
presents the firm and county attributes across these two subsamples. Panel B presents the estimates of OLS regressions 
based on the baseline models of Eq. (1) after replacing Social capital with High social capital. Total pay (Equity pay) 
is the logarithm of one plus total compensation (equity-based compensation) for a CEO during a given year as reported 
in the ExecuComp database. Control variables include CEO age, CEO tenure, IO concentration, IO total, Firm size, 
Return, Return volatility, ROA, M/B, Leverage, Cash, CAPEX, County income, County age, Education, Religiosity, 
Political strength, Population growth, Nonwhite population, Population density, Latitude, Longitude, and Distance to 
river plus industry and year fixed effects as specified in the baseline models. All of these variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Estimates are based on ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the county-level. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on two-sided tests. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Firm and county attributes across the subsamples 
 
High social capital = 1 
(N = 787) 
High social capital = 0 
(N = 787)   
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff t-value 
CEO age 56.4752 6.7080 56.4523 7.4534 0.0229 0.06 
CEO tenure 7.0838 7.0946 7.3341 7.5716 -0.2503 -0.67 
IO concentration 0.0272 0.0361 0.0255 0.0408 0.0018 0.91 
IO total 0.6780 0.2189 0.6665 0.2182 0.0116 1.05 
Firm size 7.2618 1.3777 7.2732 1.5488 0.0115 0.15 
Return 0.0146 0.0328 0.0133 0.0336 0.0014 0.82 
Return volatility 0.1017 0.0592 0.1038 0.0594 -0.0020 -0.67 
ROA 0.0463 0.0829 0.0474 0.0902 -0.0010 -0.23 
M/B 1.7996 1.0905 1.8367 1.1761 -0.0371 -0.65 
Leverage 0.2362 0.1839 0.2283 0.1758 0.0079 0.87 
Cash 0.1095 0.1483 0.1115 0.1423 -0.0020 -0.27 
CAPEX 0.0549 0.0509 0.0557 0.0567 -0.0008 -0.29 
County income 35.4429 12.911 36.3030 9.4813 -0.8601 -1.40 
County age 33.6723 2.0533 33.7155 1.7618 -0.0432 -0.44 
Education 27.8170 8.1034 28.5692 7.4169 -0.7522 -0.92 
Religiosity 0.5681 0.1233 0.5702 0.0815 -0.0019 -0.37 
Population growth 0.0087 0.0107 0.0087 0.0121 0.0001 0.03 
Nonwhite population 0.2530 0.1702 0.2577 0.1091 -0.0047 -0.66 
Population density 2.1437 7.6325 3.0870 5.5625 -0.9033 -1.80* 
Latitude 39.5607 3.9199 39.3344 3.8254 0.2262 1.15 
Longitude -88.289 11.805 -88.508 10.695 0.2187 0.38 
Distance to river 158.89 131.63 158.14 102.55 0.7513 0.12 
Political strength -17.77 72.51 -17.46 73.10 -0.3062 -0.08 
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 Panel B: Regressions using a propensity-score matched sample 
Variables Total pay Equity pay 
High social capital -0.0788** -0.2304* 
 (-2.26) (-1.91) 
All control variables Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5897 0.3019 
Number of observations 1,574 1,574 
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Table 6 
Using headquarter relocation setting to explore the relation between social capital and CEO pay  
The sample contains 959 firm-year observations for 76 firms with a single headquarter relocation during 
1996–2010, of which 35 firms (41 firms) have a social-capital-increasing relocation (social-capital-decreasing 
relocation). Panel A presents the estimates of the ordinary least squares regressions based on the baseline models of 
Eq. (1) after replacing Social capital with After, Social-capital-increasing relocation, and After × 
Social-capital-increasing relocation. After is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is from the period 
after the relocation; it equals zero if the observation is from the period before the relocation. Social-capital-increasing 
relocation is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm relocated its corporate headquarter to a county with a higher 
level of social capital; it equals zero if a firm relocated its headquarter to a county with a lower level of social capital. 
Total pay (Equity pay) is the natural logarithm of one plus total compensation (equity-based compensation) for a CEO 
during a given year as reported in the ExecuComp database. Control variables include CEO age, CEO tenure, IO 
concentration, IO total, Firm size, Return, Return volatility, ROA, M/B, Leverage, Cash, CAPEX, County income, 
County age, Education, Religiosity, Political strength, Population growth, Nonwhite population, Population density, 
Latitude, Longitude, and Distance to river plus industry and year fixed effects as specified in the baseline models. All 
of these variables are defined in the Appendix. Estimates are based on ordinary least squares regressions with standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-county clustering. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on two-sided 
tests. Panel B presents diagnostics comparing all firm attributes and the CEO pay measures across firms with 
social-capital-increasing relocation and firms with social-capital-decreasing relocation in the year immediately prior 
to the relocation event. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Effects of over-time changes in social capital on over-time changes in CEO compensation 
Variables Total_pay Equity_pay 
After 0.2913** 1.3462*** 
 (3.28) (5.08) 
Social-capital-increasing relocation 0.1606 -0.1020 
 (1.64) (-0.41) 
After × Social-capital-increasing relocation -0.2040** -0.5624* 
 (-2.13) (-1.68) 
All control variables Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.6711 0.3933 
Number of observations 959 959 
 




relocation = 1 
Social-capital-increasing  
relocation = 0 
t-statistic for  
difference in means  
Variables Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)  
Total pay 4,806.1 (5,067.6) 6,001.6 (6,656.8) -0.84 
Equity pay 2,652.1 (2,786.1) 3,515.9 (4,718.6) -0.99 
CEO tenure 5.0571 (6.2494) 4.7805 (4.0094) 0.23 
CEO age 53.371 (6.4675) 56.220 (7.4884) -1.76* 
IO concentration 0.0301 (0.0168) 0.0249 (0.0140) 1.48 
IO total 0.7771 (0.1829) 0.7151 (0.2004) 1.40 
Firm size 7.3593 (1.3610) 7.6673 (1.2511) -1.03 
ROA 0.0404 (0.0868) 0.0391 (0.0627) 0.08 
Return 0.0103 (0.0350) 0.0177 (0.0340) -0.94 
Return volatility 0.1048 (0.0532) 0.1060 (0.0416) -0.12 
M/B 1.7172 (0.6396) 1.7369 (1.1372) -0.09 
Leverage 0.2157 (0.1577) 0.2792 (0.1695) -1.39 
Cash 0.1155 (0.1642) 0.1182 (0.1644) -0.07 
CAPEX 0.0500 (0.0362) 0.0561 (0.0498) -0.61 
Number of observations 35 41  
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Table 7 
Social capital and the power-pay relation  
Regressions in Panel A use a sample that contains 22,246 firm-year observations for the period 1993–2014. 
The regression models are as specified in the baseline models in Eq. (1) after replacing Social capital with High SK, 
CEO power, or % CEO appointed directors, and the corresponding interaction variables. Total pay (Equity pay) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus total compensation (equity-based compensation) for a CEO during a given year as 
reported in the ExecuComp database. High SK equals one if Social capital for a firm in a given year is above the 
sample median value; otherwise, it equals zero. CEO power equals one if a firm’s CEO also serves as the chairperson 
of the board and president of the company in a given year; CEO power equals zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B 
use a reduced sample of 14,587 firm-year observations in which the CEO power variable is replaced by the % CEO 
appointed director variable. % CEO appointed directors is the number of directors appointed after the CEO assumed 
office divided by the total number of directors on the board for a firm in a year. Sample attrition is due to missing 
information in % CEO appointed directors. In all models and across both panels, control variables include CEO age, 
CEO tenure, IO concentration, IO total, Firm size, Return, Return volatility, ROA, M/B, Leverage, Cash, CAPEX, 
County income, County age, Education, Religiosity, Political strength, Population growth, Nonwhite population, 
Population density, Latitude, Longitude, and Distance to river plus industry and year fixed effects as specified in the 
baseline models. All of these variables are defined in the Appendix. Estimates are based on ordinary least squares 
regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-county clustering. t-statistics, in 
parentheses, are based on two-sided tests. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Total pay Equity pay Total pay Equity pay 
Panel A: Power as measured by executive titles simultaneously held by CEO 
High SK -0.0484* -0.0830 -0.0695*** -0.1437* 
 (-1.74) (-0.94) (-2.86) (-1.78) 
CEO power 0.1217*** 0.2243*** 0.0822*** 0.1108* 
 (5.01) (2.84) (4.57) (1.79) 
CEO power× High SK -0.0760** -0.2183*   
 (-2.31) (-1.80)   
     
All control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5344 0.2309 0.5336 0.2306 
Number of observations 22,246 22,246 22,246 22,246 
 
Panel B: Power as measured by directors appointed after CEO assumed office 
High SK -0.0466 -0.0015 -0.1008*** -0.2378*** 
 (-1.22) (0.10) (-3.72) (-2.65) 
% CEO appointed directors 0.2589*** 0.8071*** 0.2017*** 0.5553*** 
 (6.09) (6.17) (5.06) (4.36) 
% CEO appointed directors × High SK -0.1177** -0.5195***   
 (-1.99) (-2.68)   
     
All control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5354 0.2279 0.5351 0.2270 
Number of observations 14,587 14,587 14,587 14,587 
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Table 8 
Social capital and likelihood of unscheduled option awards to CEOs 
Model 1 uses the empirical model as specified in the baseline model. The sample contains 8,508 firm-year 
observations for the period 1993–2006. Attrition is due to missing observations in CEO age and CEO tenure. Model 
2 uses an alternate specification where CEO age and CEO tenure are excluded. That sample contains 12,812 firm-year 
observations for the period 1993–2006 with 11,149 firm-years with at least one unscheduled award in a given year 
(Unscheduled = 1) and 1,663 firm-years with no unscheduled award in a given year (Unscheduled = 0). In both models, 
the dependent variable is Unscheduled, which equals one if a firm in a given year makes at least one unscheduled 
award to its CEO; Unscheduled equals zero otherwise. CEO option awards data are from Thomson Financial Insider 
Trading, where a CEO is an individual identified in the Thomson database as either the CEO or the President of the 
company (rolecode CEO or P). Other control variables include County age, Religiosity, Political strength, Latitude, 
Longitude, and Distance to river plus industry and year fixed effects. All of these variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Estimates are based on Probit regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-county 
clustering. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on two-sided tests. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Unscheduled Unscheduled 
Social capital -0.0905** -0.1003*** 
 (-2.12) (-2.79) 
CEO age 0.0012  
 (0.44)  
CEO tenure    -0.0076**  
 (-2.53)  
IO concentration 0.1026 0.2590 
 (0.16) (0.52) 
IO total -0.0417 -0.0884 
 (-0.35) (-0.94) 
Firm size -0.1173*** -0.1155*** 
 (-7.29) (-8.41) 
Return 0.1228 -0.3493 
 (0.21) (-0.79) 
Return volatility 1.8159*** 1.6812*** 
 (4.33) (5.97) 
ROA 0.2693* 0.0643 
 (1.77) (0.58) 
M/B -0.0463** -0.0445*** 
 (-2.49) (-2.79) 
Leverage 0.3940** 0.3926*** 
 (2.56) (3.17) 
Cash 0.2638 0.1769 
 (1.52) (1.34) 
CAPEX -0.4170 -0.5389 
 (-0.90) (-1.52) 
County income -0.0028 -0.0008 
 (-0.52) (-0.18) 
Education  0.1278** 0.0123** 
 (2.00) (2.22) 
Population growth -2.3269 -0.9103 
 (-1.12) (-0.49) 
Nonwhite population -0.3473* -0.2620 
 (-1.73) (-1.47) 
Population density 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.43) (1.19) 
Other control variables Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0861 0.1011 
Number of observations 8,508 12,812 
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Table 9 
Social capital and likelihood of backdated awards to CEOs 
Model 1 uses the empirical model as specified in the baseline model. The sample contains 7,141 firm-year 
observations for the period 1993–2006. Attrition is due to missing observations in CEO age and CEO tenure. Model 
2 use an alternate specification where CEO age and CEO tenure are excluded. That sample contains 11,149 firm-year 
observations with 3,207 firm-years for the period with at least one backdated award in a given year (Backdated = 1). 
In both models, the dependent variable is the dummy variable, Backdated, which equals one if the mean cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) of all unscheduled awards that a firm grants its CEO in a given year ranks at the top 30th 
percentile of CAR in the sample; it equals zero otherwise. For a given award, CAR is the difference in cumulative 
daily stock price returns over two five-day windows, (-5, -1) and (+1, +5), straddling the date of the unscheduled 
award (day 0). CEO option awards data are from Thomson Financial Insider Trading, where a CEO is an individual 
identified in the Thomson database as either the CEO or the President of the company (rolecode CEO or P). Other 
control variables, defined in the Appendix, include County age, Religiosity, Political strength, Latitude, Longitude, 
and Distance to river plus industry and year fixed effects. Estimates are based on Probit regressions with standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-county clustering. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on two-sided 
tests. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Backdated Backdated 
Social capital -0.0726** -0.0469* 
 (-2.23) (-1.85) 
CEO age 0.0001  
 (0.01)  
CEO tenure    0.0034  
 (1.12)  
IO concentration -0.0993 -0.1643 
 (-0.13) (-0.31) 
IO total 0.0861 0.1483** 
 (0.82) (1.99) 
Firm size -0.0905*** -0.0711*** 
 (-5.75) (-6.08) 
Return -0.6079 -0.8032** 
 (-1.10) (-2.25) 
Return volatility 3.7130*** 3.1894*** 
 (9.53) (12.05) 
ROA 0.5070*** 0.2822*** 
 (3.63) (2.65) 
M/B 0.0223 -0.0050 
 (-1.37) (-0.42) 
Leverage -0.1114 -0.1094 
 (-1.03) (-1.26) 
Cash 0.0837 0.1744* 
 (0.66) (1.92) 
CAPEX 0.4841 0.3742 
 (1.15) (1.18) 
County income 0.0038 0.0024 
 (0.98) (0.76) 
Education  -0.0019 -0.0005 
 (-0.43) (-0.15) 
Population growth 0.9143 1.2290 
 (0.43) (0.79) 
Nonwhite population -0.3336** -0.1987 
 (-1.96) (-1.39) 
Population density 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.58) (0.35) 
Other control variables Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.0936 0.0842 
Number of observations 7,141 11,149 
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Table 10 
Social capital and likelihood of lucky awards to CEOs 
Model 1 uses the empirical model as specified in the baseline regression. The sample contains 3,958 firm-
year observations for the period 1996–2005. Attrition is due to missing observations in CEO age and CEO tenure. 
Model 2 uses an alternate specification where CEO age and CEO tenure are excluded. That sample contains 9,872 
firm-year observations with about 14% of firm-years with at least one lucky award in a given year (Luck = 1). In both 
models, the dependent variable is the dummy variable, Luck, which equals one if a firm awards its CEO with at least 
one lucky unscheduled option grant award in a given year; Luck equals zero otherwise. Data for Luck are from Bebchuk, 
Grinstein, and Peyer (2010). Other control variables, as defined in the Appendix, include County age, Religiosity, 
Political strength, Latitude, Longitude, and Distance to river plus industry and year fixed effects. Estimates are based 
on Probit regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-county clustering. t-statistics, in 
parentheses, are based on two-sided tests. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Luck Luck 
Social capital -0.1057* -0.0686** 
 (-1.91) (-2.09) 
CEO age 0.0015  
 (0.36)  
CEO tenure    0.0091**  
 (2.23)  
IO concentration -3.7183** -0.8353* 
 (-2.24) (-1.68) 
IO total 0.5061*** 0.1306 
 (2.93) (1.35) 
Firm size -0.0347 -0.0364*** 
 (-1.49) (-2.62) 
Return -0.2232 0.6350 
 (-0.28) (-1.64) 
Return volatility 1.1727** 0.8123*** 
 (2.35) (3.54) 
ROA 0.0426 0.0860 
 (0.14) (0.84) 
M/B -0.1723 -0.0025 
 (-0.61) (-0.21) 
Leverage 0.0721 -0.0684 
 (0.37) (-0.73) 
Cash -0.0016 0.0696 
 (-0.01) (0.72) 
CAPEX 1.4120** 0.3856 
 (2.19) (1.21) 
County income -0.0108* -0.0048 
 (-1.73) (-1.37) 
Education 0.0132** 0.0101*** 
 (2.03) (2.78) 
Population growth -3.4246 -1.2022 
 (-1.13) (-0.64) 
Nonwhite population -0.8487*** -0.2017 
 (-3.03) (-1.22) 
Population density 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.62) (0.97) 
Other control variables Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0510 0.0354 
Number of observations 3,958 9,872 
 
